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Abstract
Global value chains are highly prone to distortions in value distribution among
participants. Their global fragmentation and relational governance undermine
the effectiveness of regulatory intervention in amending these distortions. In
this paper, I propose a new mechanism to administer value distribution that is
in tune with the nature of these production systems. Building on
interdependence theory, I suggest that interdependencies inherent in the cospecialized nature of supply chains give participants the power to alter the
trade-offs between investment in social causes and economic gains and to
incentivize socially desired behavior. I show how the interdependence logic
manifests at varying levels of the GVC, including the producing constituencies,
governments, and international organizations, as well as civil society. These
dynamics create markets for social justice that are driven by relationships
among GVC participants and operate simultaneously at different scales. I
further posit that the effectiveness of interdependence relationships as a valuedistributing mechanism is socially-constructed and outline the social conditions
that determine the outcomes. I specify the varying impact of governments on
interdependence relationships – as activators, facilitators, or inhibitors of the
transformative power of interdependencies – and discuss their effectiveness.
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Nike and its retailers capture nearly 90% of the revenues of each
shoe sold, whereas the combined revenues of the manufacturers of
these shoes, which incur the cost of labor and material, amount for
12%. The labor employed in the production receives 0.4% of the
revenues (Rodrige, Comtois, & Slack, 2013). Similar patterns are
apparent across industries, including consumer electronics,
iPhones and others (Dedrick, Kraemer, & Linden, 2011; Kraemer,
Linden, & Dedrick, 2011). Such uneven value distribution is
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inconsistent with predictions of economic theory,
according to which in equilibrium, economic
actors generate rent from their participation in
value creation that is proportional to the resources
they invest (Lepak, Smith, & Taylor, 2007;
Medema, 2007; Pitelis, 2009). What then explains
the uneven distribution of value among global
value chain (GVC)’s participants? Why do neither
market nor non-market forces impose value distribution that is aligned with value creation, in
agreement with theoretical predictions? And in
the failure of markets to distribute value adequately, why do governments not correct for these
inequalities?
These questions are by no means new. Distortions of value distribution in GVCs and their
consequences for economic development and
social welfare have attracted enormous research
attention for decades. Much of the GVC literature
has sought means to reduce them and proposed a
variety of government policies towards this end
(Gereffi, 2018; Henderson et al., 2002; Kaplinsky,
2005; Milberg & Winkler, 2013; Powell, 2014;
World Bank, 2020). The stubborn persistence and
proliferation of imbalanced value distribution in
GVCs raise concerns regarding the effectiveness of
these solutions (Bair & Werner, 2011; Uramoto &
Nachum, 2018). Some studies show that not only
do the anticipated gains of the policy recommendations not always materialize, they may lead to
the opposite outcomes, locking participants in lowvalue added activities that undermine their ability
to increase the share of value from their GVC
participation (Humphrey & Schmitz, 2002; Ponte,
& Gibbon, 2005; Rossi, 2013; Taglioni & Winkler,
2016).
This state of affairs is troubling. GVCs have
become the predominant organizational platform
through which production is coordinated and
organized on a global basis, accounting at the
closing of the 2010s for 80% of global trade and
60% of global production (Antras, 2020; World
Bank, 2020). Some observers suggest that they have
come to displace firms as the principal entity of
value creation (Miles & Snow, 2007). Inadequate
value distribution of an organizational form of such
significance is disturbing. It affects the well-being
of millions of people around the world and undermines global value-creation potential (Bapuji,
Ertug, & Shaw, 2020).
In this paper, I seek to address this gap. I build on
research on power in GVCs (Dallas, 2014; Dallas,
Ponte, & Sturgeon, 2019; Grabs & Ponte, 2019;

Journal of International Business Policy

Lilac Nachum

Mahutga, 2014), and combine it with insights of
interdependence theory (Coleman, 2011; Deutsch,
1949, 1973; Johanson & Johanson, 2005), to
develop a conceptualization of power that originates in interdependence relationships among
GVC participants. I posit that interdependence
relationships are a powerful mechanism for change
because interdependencies are inherent in the very
nature of value creation in GVCs (Gereffi, 2018),
and their reciprocal nature is in tune with the
combination of collaboration (in value creation)
and competition (in value capture) that characterizes these production systems (Chatain & Zemsky,
2011; Lepak et al., 2007; Tjosvold & Wu, 2009).
Conceptualizing interdependence relationships as a
socially constructed concept that is subject to social
legitimation (Coleman, Vallacher, & Noward, 2011;
Emerson, 1962; Kelly et al., 2003), I outline the
transformative power of interdependence dynamics
as the outcome of the social legitimation of the
multiple societal contexts in which GVCs operate,
and demonstrate its variation across societal settings and different GVC constellations. This conceptualization offers ground for distinguishing
among four generic types of GVCs that vary by
the effectiveness of the interdependence logic as a
force for change and result in varying distributional
outcomes. I show the varying role of government
policy in each of these GVC types and suggest that
the interdependence logic does not replace governments but rather assign them different roles.
With these conceptualizations, I advance discussions of value distribution in GVCs in several
important ways. For one, the employment of the
interdependence logic as a mechanism for change
offers a novel approach for amending distributional
distortions in GVCs. This approach is particularly
suitable for a fragmented and diffused production
system like the GVC that is scattered across different institutional settings with no hegemonic power
to regulate them (Overdevest & Zeitlin, 2014; Sabel
& Zeitlin, 2010). Interdependence relationships
derive their transformative power from dynamics
inherent in the nature of GVCs, making them a
powerful solution for correcting for distributional
distortions, and substitute for a predominant
authority in setting up the terms for operation
and value distribution (Mayer & Phillips, 2017;
Schrank & Whitford, 2011). Interdependencies
create markets for social justice whereby economic
incentives, originating in relationships internal to
the GVCs, bring about change (Budish, Lee, &
Shim, 2019). Their transformative power originates
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in the very reasons for distributional distortions,
namely power and interdependence asymmetries
that are inherent in the nature of GVCs.
Further, by placing societal legitimation of the
interdependence logic at the center of the discussion, I offer a framework for a systematic analysis of
context, and contribute to extant research whose
case-based, fragmented nature has often challenged
such analyses. This framework enables me to
delineate the contextual characteristics that permit
the manifestation of the interdependence logic and
define the boundaries of its transforming power.
Absent these characteristics, interdependence relationships do not increase social welfare and may
even be employed to undermine it. These contributions advance research about the complementarity between transnational and domestic efforts
as the key for social change and just distributional
outcomes (Amengual, 2010; Amengual & Chirot,
2016; Bartley, 2011; Bruszt & McDermott, 2014;
Locke, 2013). The framework I introduce offers
ground for expanding these discussions to multiple
types of GVCs, including South–South and South–
North GVCs, which represent distinctive challenges
for distributional outcomes. It also draws attention
to constituencies that have gone unnoticed by
extant research although they have considerable
impact on value distribution, such as consumers
and their consumption behavior.
Lastly, the framework I develop provides an
overarching theoretical ground for identifying the
diverse and nuanced role that governments play in
activating, facilitating, or prohibiting the interdependence logics. It enables one to examine the
varying consequences of government policy for
value distribution in different types of GVCs. This
analysis offers suggestive normative lessons regarding the adequate role for governments in amending
distributional distortions in GVCs.

ADDRESSING DISTORTIONS IN VALUE
DISTRIBUTION IN GVCS: THE THEORETICAL
BUILDING BLOCKS
The framework I develop below derives its impetus
from three principles that underlie value distribution in GVCs. Below I outline the theoretical
underpinnings of each of them.1
Goal: Economic Development Versus Value
Distribution
Discussions of value distribution in GVCs are
typically geared towards understanding of the way
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by which countries can employ GVC participation
as a mechanism towards economic and social
development (Coe & Young, 2015; Gereffi, 2018;
Henderson et al., 2002; Schrank, 2004). Implicit in
these discussions is the search for unilateral gains of
individual countries and they result in policy
recommendations that would serve this end. I posit
that this approach is inconsistent with the contested nature of value distribution in GVCs
whereby gains captured by each participant are
dependent on impoverishment of others (Chatain
& Zemsky, 2011; Lepak et al., 2007; McGrath,
2018). Nor is it in tune with a global production
system that transcends national borders and operates on multiple geographic scales, whereby the
association of value to particular locations is
obscured by global ambiguities (Baldwin, 2016;
Mayer & Gereffi, 2010). Such a system requires an
approach that encompasses the system as a whole,
and is attentive to the fact that amending distortions in one country may accentuate them in
others (McGrath, 2018; Werner, 2019). The framework I develop below reflects on these principles
and changes the focus from developmental and
social goals of individual countries to a balanced
distribution of value in the GVC as a whole. The
GVC thus becomes the unit of analysis, and
attention shifts to the dynamics that determine
value distribution in the system as a whole rather
than the economic development of individual
nodes within it (Dicken, et al., 2001).

Constituencies: Participants in the Negotiation
for Value
Discussions of the constituencies that negotiate for
value in GVCs have focused predominantly on lead
firms and their manufacturers as the major contenders for value and determinants of distributional outcomes (Gereffi, Humphry, & Sturgeon,
2005). Recent attempts offered broader frameworks
that view these participants within a broad societal
context (Coe, Dicken, & Hess, 2008; Gereffi, 2019)
but the focus remained the dyad as the critical
determinant of the outcome (Coe & Young,
2015, 2019). In departure from this approach, I
suggest that the structure of GVCs, whereby layers
of activities are nested within each other with cross
influences among them, requires a framework that
recognizes relationships among multiple participants whose collective and simultaneous actions
determine the distributional outcomes (Gereffi,
2019; Levy, 2008). To varying degrees, and in
different ways, each of these constituencies has
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the power to influence the behavior of others, but
the substance of their power, the means they
possess to exploit it, and the geographic scale at
which power manifests are different (Antras, 2020;
Davis, Kaplinsky, & Morris, 2018; McGrath, 2018;
Werner, 2019). A unified framework that ties these
multiple participants together mirrors the plurality
of causes of distributional distortions and offers an
appropriate lens through which to analyze the
separate and collective influences of different constituencies and the linkages among them as they
cut within and across GVC scales (Caschili, Medda,
& Wilson, 2015; Levy, 2008).

Mechanisms: Sources of Power to Affect Value
Distribution
Explicitly or not, most GVC research has viewed
power as the determinant of the economic gains
and distributional outcomes of value chain participation (Dallas, 2014; Dallas et al., 2019; Davis
et al., 2018). Research in this area has specified the
analytical scope within which multiple power
dimensions manifest and are exploited by different
constituencies, whether in governance structure
and GVC type (Gereffi et al., 2005; Grabs & Ponte,
2019) or else in relational dynamics among participants (Coe & Young, 2015; Henderson et al.,
2002). I build on these conceptualizations and
extend them by advancing a notion of power that
originates
in
interdependence
relationships
(Deutsch, 1949, 1973; Johanson & Johanson,
2005; Coleman, 2011; Tjosvold & Wisse, 2009).
For several reasons, this approach is particularly
appealing with reference to GVCs. For one, interdependencies are germane to the nature of GVCs
whose co-specialized nature entails that value creation by each constituency determines the ability
of others to create value. This implies that there are
high levels of reciprocal interdependencies among
participants which shape the nature of the relationships among them (Gereffi et al., 2005). The
appeal of an interdependence relationships lies in
that it derives its transformative power from the
very conditions that cause distortions in value
distribution – that is, power and interdependence
asymmetries (Medema, 2007), turning the causes of
the distortions into the force for correcting them.
Moreover, participants’ contribution to value
creation by the GVC depends on their ability to
appropriate value because resources available for
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participants to invest in value creation are generated via value appropriation (Chatain & Zemsky,
2011; Lepak et al., 2007; Pitelis, 2009). In such
value-creation systems, interests of individual
actors cannot be fully separated from each other
(Deutsch, 1973), undermining the effectiveness of
uni-directional sources of power whereby powerful
actors impose their will on less powerful ones
(Dahl, 1957; Emerson, 1962). Interdependence
relationships offer adequate basis for the understanding of these dynamics because they enable
one to conceptualize relationships that connect
participants to each other simultaneously in shared
interest in maximizing joint value creation and in
competition for respective shares of this value
(Tjosvold & Wu, 2009).
In addition, the interdependence logic is in tune
with the ubiquity of relational governance in GVCs
(Gereffi et al., 2005; Coe et al., 2008; Dicken et al.,
2001). This governance mechanism resides outside
the domain of formal authority and undermines
sources of power that derive their impetus from such
authority (Mayer & Gereffi, 2010). The power of
interdependence, which originates in reciprocity and
mutual interests in the pursuit of exchange relationships, is consistent with these non-market voluntary
relational governance mechanisms and overcomes
limitations of concepts of power that are based on
control and domination (Schrank, 2005). This is ever
more so as these relational dynamics take place across
local jurisdictions that operate in parallel to each
other with no sovereign with hegemonic authority
and power to control them (Overdevest & Zeitlin,
2014, 2018; Sabel & Zeitlin, 2010).
Lastly, the interdependence logic is less sensitive
to the erosion effect of crossing borders that is
inherent in the way GVCs function. As constituencies become foreign when they cross borders, their
power is transformed and at time entirely dissipates, undermining the value of sources of power
that are defined by borders (McGrath, 2018; Mezzadra & Neilson, 2013). These GVC attributes make
the interdependence logic a powerful mechanism
for changing behavior, and offer compelling logic
for conceptualizing distributional outcomes in
GVCs. In the following section, I outline the variety
of ways by which interdependence relationships
empower GVC participants to amend behavior and
channel it towards social causes.

GVCs and markets for social justice

THE POWER OF INTERDEPENDENCIES AS
A MEANS TOWARDS BALANCED VALUE
DISTRIBUTION
The premise of interdependence theory is that
goals’ overlap and dependence on actions of others
for their achievement create interdependence relationships among otherwise independent constituencies (Coleman et al., 2010). The greater the
need for resources of others as a condition for the
attainment of own goals, the stronger the interdependence relationships. GVCs are prime example of
such situations. The desire to benefit from specialization has led to fragmentation of the production
among multiple participants, each specializing in a
single part of the production and dependent on
others for both inputs into its own production as
well as for market for its output (Gereffi, 2018). The
sources of interdependence vary considerably in
their substance and nature, but they share a
common feature in that one’s goal cannot be
accomplished without some provisions of others
(Johnson & Johnson, 2005; Kelley et al., 2003). For
instance, Apple is dependent upon Foxconn for the
manufacturing of its electronic components; Bangladesh is dependent on cotton-growing countries
for the production of textiles. Neither of these can
accomplish their own production goals without
these respective inputs. In turns out that Foxconn
is dependent on Apple for its ability to put its
manufacturing skills to effective use and cottongrowing countries need Bangladesh as a market for
their cotton.
The strength of interdependencies varies across
constituencies to relationships because some have
more alternative options to achieve their goals than
others (Coleman et al., 2010; Emerson, 1962;
Tjosvold & Wisse, 2009). Size variations determine
the availability of one’s own resources as possible
alternatives for reliance on others (Dindial, Clegg,
& Voss, 2020). Resource-rich entities may possess
some of the resources internally, making them less
dependent on others, or else have access to alternative sources that offer similar benefits (Johnson
& Johnson, 2005). Greater specialization and assets
specificity to relationships that have little productive use outside of them reduce alternative sources
and increase interdependencies (Williamson,
1996). These differences create interdependence
asymmetries among members to the relationships
(Coleman et al., 2010). For instance, Zara employs
its own resources to manufacture internally about
half of the apparel it sells, reducing its dependence
on apparel manufacturers. H&M employs about
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2000 manufacturers around the world, decreasing
its dependence on individual manufacturers and
enabling it to switch production among them.
Asymmetries give less-dependent actors the
power to amend the behavior of the more dependent ones. GVCs offer multiple examples of the
way by which less-dependent participants, including lead firms, countries, and civil society, employ
their power to amend the behavior of more dependent participants in directions they deem appropriate. Dependent actors, whose dependency
originates in the narrow range of alternatives they
have for given relationships, are likely to accept the
demand of powerful members and amend their
behavior accordingly. Less-dependent members
have incentives to employ their power to modify
others’ behavior because their own goal achievement depends on the behavior of others (Magee &
Galinsky, 2008; Tjosvold & Wisse, 2009). The
pressure of global apparel brands on their manufacturers to improve governance standards in their
factories in order for them to avoid reputational
damage on this ground is a case in point (Alamgir &
Banerjee, 2018; Donaghey & Reinecke, 2018). These
variations define the options and constraints that
constituencies can impose on others, the mechanisms they have to amend each other behavior, and
the strength of their transforming power (Lammers
& Galinsky, 2009).
Interdependence relationships are inherent in
the nature of GVCs, whose fragmented, co-specialized character implies that participants’ ability to
produce output is entirely dependent upon inputs
received by others (Gereffi, 2018). The multiplicity
of the participants involved in GVCs, their varying
positions and roles, and their diverse sources of
power create a variety of complex interdependence
relationships (Levy, 2008).
Thus, in low-skilled, labor-intensive industries,
size, skills, and financial power variations among
lead firms, their manufacturers and labor create
vast interdependence asymmetries (Dindial et al.,
2020; Gereffi et al., 2005). Lead firms’ global reach
and mobility enable switching manufacturers and
countries at relatively low cost, offering them more
alternative options than those available to the
manufacturers, and reducing their interdependence
on them. Lead firms in these industries engage with
thousands of suppliers whose skills are often
undifferentiated, and at time develop capabilities
that are specific to lead firms’ needs. Ikea’s relationships with its South-East Asian manufacturers
suggest an example of such relationships.
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Capability upgrade and greater differentiation of
these manufacturers increased interdependence
asymmetries due to their specificity to Ikea’s needs
(Ivarsson & Alvstam, 2011). Elsewhere, interdependence relationships might be characterized by a
lower level of asymmetry, such as the relationships
between China’s SIAM and GM, and at time no
asymmetries, for which the relationships between
Apple and Foxconn suggest an example (Dindial
et al., 2020. Apple is Foxconn’s dominant client
and Foxconn handles the majority of Apple’s
production, and both firms have found it difficult
to diversify their business relationships (Chan, Pun,
& Selden, 2013).
Interdependence asymmetries also prevail at the
macro level (Baldwin, 2012; Newman & Posner,
2011). Political scientists have long recognized that
globalization entails that countries’ political and
economic prosperities are inextricably tied together
in complex interdependence relationships (Keohane & Nye, 1973, 1987; Wagner, 1988). These
interdependencies serve as a source of power
employed by governments to modify the political
discourse in other countries, and achieve various
political goals. In the context of GVCs, the fragmented nature of the production and the separation of the production and consumption that
characterizes GVCs gives less-dependent countries
leverage over more dependent ones. The power of
these interdependencies and the balance between
the participating entities to the relationships
depends on their own resources and the alternative
they have. For instance, in low-skill, low-cost
GVCs, there are often multiple sources of supply
whereas the consumption is concentrated in a
small number of countries. This creates large interdependence asymmetries between producing and
consuming countries, giving the latter power to
demand change in return for market access. The
power that originates in these interdependences
can be employed in a variety of ways, for the greater
good of those holding the power, keeping blind
eyes to injustice and human-rights violations, or
else to demand social change and governance
standards (Farrell & Newman, 2019).
GVC production-related interdependencies are
nested within a global political system in which
multiple international organizations (IGOs) with
varying mandates and sources of power create
additional layers of interdependence relationships
(Abbott & Snidal, 2000, 2010; Gereffi, 2019; Levy,
2008; Rodrik, 2020; Standing, 2008). They serve as a
form of supranational governance mechanism that
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mediates between national and international
norms to improve governance standards in GVCs.
IGOs are a natural constituency to oversee global
phenomena like GSCs but by their nature lack
regulatory power. Their power originates in the
endorsement of their signatory members. The latter
in return are dependent upon IGOs for their
credibility and legitimacy in the political milieu,
creating interdependence relationships that originate in soft power (Nyu, 2004). IGOs can affect
social behavior in GVCs by directly demanding
decision-makers to change their behavior in line
with preferred outcomes, and indirectly by mobilizing other governments to exert pressure and pose
a credibility threat for non-compliance to act in
line with their preference (Barnett & Finnemore,
2004).
The formal institutional structure that surrounds
GVCs operates within a broad set of informal,
voluntary associations such as NGOs, human-rights
organizations, and other multi-stakeholder pressure
groups. These create a form of private global
governance that has exhibited remarkable power
to bring about behavioral change (Cabral et al.,
2019; Chambers & Kopstein, 2006), leading commentators to refer to it as a ‘dictatorship of virtue’
(Hayden, 2002). Although deprived of any formal
entitlement, civil society has become the de facto
‘legitimating authority’ whose moral demands
serve as forceful potency in enforcing social standards and shaping GVC distributional outcomes
(Palazzo & Scherer, 2006). This power has been
utilized in relation to all GVC constituencies,
including producing entities, national governments, and international organizations. The diffused nature of civil society and its amorphic form
lowers its dependency on others but legitimation
dynamics also operate the other way around, albeit
to a lower degree. Figure 1 summarizes the interdependence relationships among the multiple constituencies involved in GVCs, and shows the
multiple layers in which interdependencies take
place.
The power of the interdependence relationships
summarized in Figure 1 manifests via a variety of
mechanisms. Interdependencies among lead firms,
manufacturers, and labor originate in market-based
relationships and are dictated by market forces of
supply and demand. These economically driven
interdependencies could be extended to the
domain of social behavior. The introduction of
codes of conduct by lead firms across GVCs, which
represent privately imposed standards that define
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Figure 1 Interdependence
relationships in global value
chains (arrows specify the
interdependence
relationships).
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Civil Society: NGOs, social activists, pressure groups
International Organizations

Producing countries

Consuming countries

Participants in the production:
Lead firms
Manufacturers;
Manufacturers
Labor

Producing countries

Consuming countries
Internati

International Organizations

Civil Society: NGOs, social activists, pressure groups

the terms of governance, derive their enforcement
power from the dependency of the manufacturers
on lead firms for access to markets (Hamilton,
Senauer, & Petrovic, 2011). Lacking statutory
authority to inspect or penalize other firms, the
regulatory power of lead firms comes instead from
their behavior as customers. As gatekeepers to large
consumer markets, they can reward compliant
suppliers with more business and punish violators
by excluding them from their supply chains
(Amengual, Distelhorst, & Tobin, 2020). Lead firms
thus evoke market forces to alter manufacturers’
incentives towards socially desired behavior and
create economic costs for non-compliance (Bartley,
2018; Distelhorst et al., 2015; Distelhorst & Locke,
2018). Indeed, research shows that just being
connected to global networks, via either trade or
outsourcing linkages, improves labor conditions in
GVCs (Berik & Rodgers, 2010), speaking to the
power of lead firms to bring change.
Interdependencies are also apparent between
firms and governments (Tjosvold, Peng, & Chen,
2008). Governments’ control over access to markets
and resources that firms need give them the power
to demand change. Requests by governments of
producing countries for pay raises to manufacturers
for output sold, or demand to assume responsibility
for improvement of labor conditions in factories
suggest examples of such power. In parallel, firms’
mobility and ability to flexibly relocate their activities offer them power in the relationships with

governments seeking to attract investment to their
countries (Henisz & Zelner, 2005).
Governments also have a variety of mechanisms
to amend each other’s behavior, both bilaterally, by
evoking political and economic interdependencies,
and multilaterally, by activating other governments and multi-governmental bodies to impose
collective pressures. By employing these mechanisms, governments create political and economic
costs for non-compliance and could amend the
political discourse towards social change (Barnett &
Duvall, 2005; Newman & Posner, 2011; Wagner,
1988). Schrank (2009) demonstrates how the US
government conditioned preferential market access
on improvement of industrial relations in the
Caribbean Basin, at the time the source of half
the apparel imported into the US. Policymakers in
the Caribbean Basin changed their labor laws into
compliance with international standards and
enforced them when they signed the Dominican
Republic-Central American Free Trade Agreement
with the US.
IGOs’ power to advance their social agenda
manifests in the form of soft laws whose ratification
by member states gives them power and authority.
IGOs utilize this power to pose a threat to countries’ credibility and legitimacy within the global
political milieu (Abbott & Snidal, 2000, 2010). They
have demonstrated the ability to impose their
normative framework to orchestrate coordinated
actions by public, private, and social stakeholders
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and leverage their convening power to promote
social change (Postuma & Rossi, 2017). For
instance, the ILO was instrumental in the establishment of Bangladesh’s ACCORD and extending
it to building safe and sustainable working conditions in factories after the Rana Plaza disaster
(Donaghey & Reinecke, 2018).
Civil society exploits publicity and threat of
legitimacy damage as its prominent mechanism,
using media venues for questioning and criticizing
behavior its members deem inadequate (Hayden,
2002; Kaldor, Anheier, & Glasius, 2003; Sangeeta,
2003). As social justice and inequality assumed
premier position in determining economic, political, and social legitimacy of firms and countries,
this form of soft power has manifested across GVCs.
Voluntary adaptation of codes of conduct by lead
firms illustrate the transformative power of such
pressures (Locke, 2013). Legitimacy damage has
become a powerful mechanism to amend national
and regional political agendas as well (Anholt,
2006; Soule & Olzak, 2004). The introduction of
minimum wage legislation and its enforcement
across countries were often in response to such
pressures. These have also served to enact private
certification schemes and legal requirements
towards the construction of sustainable transnational governance regimes (Overdevest & Zeitlin,
2014, 2018). Jepersen et al. (2014) show that
negative publicity initiated by NGOs was the most
decisive factor that led to the adoption of public
and private standards in food GVCs in Asia.
Table 1 summarizes the interdependence relationships in GVCs and presents their determinants
and power to bring about change. It illustrates the
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variety of economic and political costs that can be
created via interdependencies among GVC participants, and shows their power to alter incentives
and change behavior. In the following section, I
outline the contextual conditions that determine
the effectiveness of the power derived from interdependence relationships to amend distributional
distortions across different GVCs. I suggest that
interdependence relationships afford participants
the power to change behavior but society determines whether they utilize it towards maximization of
broad social welfare or otherwise.

CHANNELING THE TRANSFORMING POWER OF
INTERDEPENDENCE TOWARDS BALANCED
VALUE DISTRIBUTION: THE IMPACT OF
SOCIETAL CONTEXT
Interdependence theory posits that interdependence relationships and their outcomes are subject
to societal approval, in which legitimation processes define their nature and boundaries. Hence,
the range of acceptable interdependence relationships and the scope of behavior associated with
them reflect societal norms and vary across societal
contexts (Coleman et al., 2011; Kelly et al., 2003).
Societal norms also delineate the boundaries for the
utilization of the power that originates in interdependence relationships (Malinoski, 2012; Oyserman, 2006; Tjosvold, Sun, & Wan, 2005).
Interdependence theory further suggests that societal claims for approval are particularly prevalent in
relation to distributional justice, and they manifest
most powerfully when interdependence relationships are strong and asymmetries are substantial, as

Table 1 Interdependence relationships in GVCs

Relationships

Determinants of interdependence
asymmetries and strength

Mechanisms to amend behavior

Labor–manufacturers
Manufacturers-–lead
firms

Skills, differentiation
Skills, differentiation, financial prowess,
market power, geographic scope, GVC
position
Monopolistic power over resources and
markets within jurisdictions
Market access; consumption behavior

Market-based employer–employee relationships
Market-based buyer–supplier relationships

Manufacturers/lead
firms–countries
Producing countries–
consuming countries
Producing/consuming
countries–IGOs
All participating
firms/countries–civil
society

Members’ endorsement; soft power
Broad societal legitimacy
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Access to resources; terms of use
Trade relationships; political relationships – sanctions, soft
power (bilaterally, multilaterally); consumers’ boycotts and
purchasing behavior
Mobilize members to execute agenda; legitimacy/credibility in
global political milieu
Publicity via media venues; ‘court of public opinion’

GVCs and markets for social justice

High

Producing Country

Figure 2 Context, the power
of interdependence
relationship, and value
distribution in GVC.

Low

they often are in GVCs (Caney, 2005; Deutsch,
1985).
Societal context is thus likely to be a powerful
force that shapes the effectiveness of the interdependence logic as a mechanism for advancing
social welfare in GVCs. Specifically, it determines
which constituencies are perceived as legitimate
actors in affecting value distribution and are
awarded the power to instill change. Studies show
vast variations across countries in legitimating
actors such as private and foreign firms, IGOs,
and civil society to exploit the power of interdependence relationships towards the accomplishment of societal goals (Barry, 2001; Caschili et al.,
2015; GjØlberg, 2009). As well, societal context
determines constituencies’ inclination to employ
their power and channel private gains towards
broad societal gains (Janmaat, 2013; Schmidt-Catran, 2016). Societies vary in their collective views
of egalitarian distribution among society members,
and these variations are closely reflected in government policies and other institutional arrangements
(Greckhamer, 2011; Malinoski, 2012; Oyserman,
2006). Further, context determines constituencies’
ability to activate the interdependence power to
bring about social change, including the economic
and financial means to do so, and the rights to
express their voice without threat of negative
consequences (Chambers & Kopstein, 2006). Freedom of expression varies a great deal across countries, jeopardizing the underlying mechanisms that
enable constituencies to express their view of social
injustice and exercise their power to amend it
(Brechenmacher, 2017). Absent these characteristics, interdependence relationships are unlikely to
provide a viable mechanism for correcting for
distributional distortions in GVCs.
GVCs create complex context for the manifestation of interdependence power. Driven by the
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desire to exploit cross-country differences in
resources and skills (Gereffi, 2018), they are typically scattered across diverse societal settings, and
are subject to multiple and often conflicting views
of interdependencies and the exploitation of their
power. They create incompatible demands for
transnational regulatory integration in the face of
starkly different needs of the countries involved in
GVCs, and continuous struggle to strike a balance
between conflicting logics (Bartley, 2018; Bruszt &
McDermott, 2014; Greenwood, Diaz & Li, 2011;
Levy, 2008).
In Figure 2, I present a parsimonious classification of the contextual combinations of varying
constellations of GVCs distinguished by the power
of the interdependence logic to amend distribution
distortions. I refer to producing and consuming
countries as the locus of the negotiation for value
capture and the arena in which the power of the
interdependence logic as a mechanism for social
change is being contested.2 The transacting constituencies, namely lead firms, their suppliers and
employees, and the respective national governments involved, are associated with the producing
and consuming countries by way of citizenship,
legal place of incorporation, and jurisdiction.
Although global by their very nature, the power
of IGOs and civil society is determined by the
extent to which these countries affiliate themselves
with these institutions and enable their power
within their jurisdictions. Societal perception of
the interdependence logic and its power in the
producing and consuming countries thus determine its effectiveness in correcting for distributional distortions.
Simplifying assumptions that underlie the framework presented in Fig. 2 should be borne in mind
when discussing its implications. The split into
high- and low-interdependence countries hide

Consuming Country
Low
High
1
2
Distorted value distribution
Distributional outcomes determined via
(Interdependence relationships ineffective
interdependence asymmetries between
in administering value distribution)
conflicting logics of producing entities
3
Distributional outcomes determined via
interdependence asymmetries between
conflicting logics of consuming and
producing entities

4
Balance value distribution
(Driven by interdependence relationships)
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nuances of this power as a continuum with the full
range of degrees between high and low interdependence. Further, a single GVC may bring together
multiple consuming and producing countries with
different interdependence scores, blurring the distinction between high- and low-interdependence
countries.
Below I discuss the likely effectiveness of the
power of interdependence relationships to instill
socially desired value distribution in the different
GVCs represented in Figure 2. I illustrate these
dynamics by a range of examples drawn from the
apparel industry. This industrial focus enables me
to observe the impact of the interdependence logic
in isolation from that of industrial characteristics.
As one of the most global and diverse GVCs, the
apparel GVC is particularly appealing for this study.
The global apparel industry was worth more than
$1.4 trillion in 2019, 14% higher than in 2018
(McKinsey, 2020). According to World Trade Organization trade statistics, in 2018, growth of global
apparel trade accounted for more than 10% of the
annual growth in world export value, the highest
share by any single industry. Importantly for my
interest here, this vast and dynamic economic
activity takes place in globally spread production
networks that bring together a highly diverse set of
players, with different sources of power and means
of value creation. These participants are guided by
different moral and normative stances towards
societal equality and justice (Laudel, 2010; Powell,
2014), making the negotiations that govern value
distribution highly contentious (Rodriguez-Garavito, 2005; Schrank, 2004; Tokatli, 2013). These
features offer a rich context for observation of the
relationships of interest.

Cell 1: Interdependence Power Ineffective
in Administering Value Distribution – Distorted
Value Distribution
Cell 1 represents GVCs in which both the producing and consuming countries are low-interdependence countries that do not endorse egalitarian
distribution and prohibit actions towards social
upgrading. Such a societal context is likely to
undermine the inclination and ability of GVC
constituencies to exercise the power of interdependencies to correct for distributional distortions,
turning these distortions into the status quo.
The apparel industry in Ethiopia suggests an
example. Ethiopia’s wages for garment workers are
the world’s lowest, about a quarter of the lowest
elsewhere, according to the International Labour
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Organization’s (ILO) wage statistics. Ethiopia has
not ratified the ILO human-rights and minimum
wage agreements, and has no minimum wage
legislation. Foreign investment has been at the
center of Ethiopia’s economic growth model and
low wages were perceived as central to the achievement of this goal (Oqubay, 2019). Although
Ethiopia endorsed the ILO’s Freedom of Association
Convention already in 1963, well-functioning labor
unions are rare, and ineffective in expressing
workers’ voices and improving their negotiating
power vis-à-vis employers. With strong control over
the Internet and social media, Ethiopian authorities have hindered societal pressure for change. In
2019, Internet shutdowns in Ethiopia were more
frequent and lasted longer than in any other
African country but Algeria (Karombo, 2020).
Ethiopia ranks at the bottom of the FHI 360’s Civil
Society Index, an indicator of the capacity of civil
society to bring about change, among all SubSaharan-African countries but Angola and Burundi.
Although the second most populous country in
Africa and the 12th in the world, the number of
NGOs in the country is below the emerging market
average, as well as Ethiopia’s participation in IGOs.
Nor has foreign participation amended distribution distortions. The ownership and management
of most textile and apparel manufacturing facilities
in Ethiopia have demonstrated little, if any, concern for governance practices and social welfare in
their factories. Almost all the textile and apparel
manufacturers in Ethiopia originate in China,
India, Pakistan, and Turkey, countries ranked low
on multiple indicators of the prevalence of interdependence, such as freedom of speech, egalitarianism, and openness, below even many other
emerging markets. Only three manufacturers
involve Western ownership, and the small scale of
outsourcing by other Western brands has undermined their power to instill change (Mihretu &
Llobet, 2017). Attempts by global activists and
human-rights advocates to put pressure for change
have had no consequences in the face of tightly
held power by Ethiopia’s government (Barrett &
Baumann-Pauly, 2019).
Ethiopia suggests an example of a situation in
which interdependence relationships are an ineffective mechanism to improve distributional outcomes. In its desire to attract foreign investment
and boost global competitiveness, Ethiopia’s government has forfeited social goals. This example
demonstrates the critical role that local forces play
in enabling the power of interdependence to

GVCs and markets for social justice

manifest itself and shows the inability of lead firms,
IGOs, and civil society to instill change in the face
of opposing government (Brustz & McDermott,
2014; Distelhorst et al., 2015). Studies have demonstrated similar outcomes elsewhere. Lead firms in
Bangladesh have achieved minimal improvement
of labor conditions and distributional outcomes in
the face of non-cooperative and at times opposing
governments (Bair, Anner, & Blasi, 2020; Siddiqui &
Uddin, 2016). The ILO Better Work Program failed
to improve social conditions in Indonesia’s garment industry for similar reasons (Amengual &
Chirot, 2016).

Cell 2: Distributional Outcomes Negotiated
Between Conflicting Interdependence Logics
of Producing Entities
Cells 2 and 3 represent GVCs situated across
societal settings with mixed, and at times, conflicting views, of the interdependence logics and its
power. Typically, in such situations, the logic of the
less-dependent participant, whose less dependency
affords him or her more power in the relationships,
prevails, and at the extreme, may gain full dominance over the other logic (Ashraf, Ahmadsimab, &
Pinkse, 2017; Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005; Greenwood et al., 2011). In GVCs, however, interdependence asymmetries are usually less decisive and
involve elements of mutual dependence, challenging the reconciliation of conflicting logics and the
creation of a balanced integration among them
(Bartley, 2018; Bruszt & McDermott, 2014). Cells 2
and 3 present varying forms of the co-existence of
conflicting logics.
Cell 2 describes GVCs established by global
brands, most typically originating in Western
countries, seeking to take advantage of low-cost
production in some of the world’s poorest countries
to sell low-cost products predominantly in Western
markets. For instance, 84% of H&M sales in the
2010s were generated in these markets (although
the share of emerging markets has been growing
rapidly) whereas its production is outsourced to
nearly 2000 independent apparel manufacturers
predominantly in emerging markets. The gap
between the producing and consuming countries
is such GVCs creates tension between conflicting
logics and shapes varying distributional outcomes.
The apparel industries in Bangladesh and Cambodia offer an example. These countries are similar
in terms of their level of economic development
and industrial structure, but social welfare in their
apparel industries varies considerably (Berik &
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Rodgers, 2010). Laborers in Cambodia’s apparel
industry are among the highest paid employees in
the country’s manufacturing industries, and their
wages have been rising continuously over decades
(Thul, 2018). In comparison, wages of Bangladeshi
workers have deteriorated in real terms over the
years, falling far short of the increase in labor
productivity registered during this period (Uramoto
& Nachum, 2018). Further, in comparison to three
2012/13 fatal incidences in apparel factories in
Bangladesh with a combined toll of 1252 deaths,
Cambodia registered a single fatal incident with a
death toll of two people (Stephenson, 2013).
A number of societal conditions offer an explanation for these differences. For one, fewer than 5%
of Bangladesh’s 4 million garment employees are
unionized, representing some of the weakest labor
union conditions in Asia (Kucera, 2004; Siddiqui &
Uddin, 2016). Bangladesh’s factory owners enjoy
considerable political clout, holding about 10% of
the Bangladesh Parliament’s 350 seats and having
strong ties with government officials. These factors
enable them to tilt policy in directions that serve
their goals and keep low wage levels and lax safety
standards in their factories (Alamgir & Banerjee,
2018; Chalmers, 2013). Even the 2013 Rana Plaza
tragedy that placed Bangladesh at the center of the
global debate on labor conditions and pay in GVCs
has not brought about noticeable change (Bair,
Anner, & Blasi, 2020).
In contrast, unionization rates among Cambodia’s 300,000 apparel employees are among the
highest of any major apparel-producing country,
giving Cambodian labor power to exercise their
voice on a range of issues ranging from failure to
raise wages to labor safety (Stephenson, 2013).
Cambodia’s government has demonstrated a strong
commitment to the improvement of labor conditions and closely supervised their implementation.
Further, in contrast to the predominantly local
ownership of Bangladeshi factories, Cambodia’s
textile and garment factories have been foreignowned by firms from Taiwan, Singapore, Thailand,
and Malaysia throughout their entire history (Kolben, 2004). These foreign owners have been pivotal
in securing labor pay and safety conditions in their
production facilities.
Governments of consuming countries have
played a critical role in improving distributional
distortions in Cambodia by utilizing the power of
interdependence. In 1999, the US signed a bilateral
trade deal with Cambodia that conditioned market
access of apparel export to the US upon
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improvements in labor standards. In contrast to
strong resistance for change in Bangladesh, there
was broad support for the program of Cambodia’s
Garment Manufacturers Association, policymakers,
employer organizations, and trade unions (Berik &
Rodgers, 2010; Polaski, 2006). Cambodia’s taxation
level is indicative of social endorsement of egalitarian distribution that is absent in Bangladesh.
When adjusted to size (Cambodia population is
about a tenth of Bangladesh’s), Cambodia has more
than four times the number of NGOs than
Bangladesh and its membership of IGOs is almost
eight times that of Bangladesh, speaking for societal
legitimation of these influences on local social
affairs.
Variations in interdependence asymmetries in
the respective GVCs suggest another reason for
varying distributional outcomes in the two countries. Bangladesh is the world’s second-largest
apparel exporter and has a production capacity to
support production volumes on a scale and scope
that few apparel exporters can match (Yunus &
Yamagata, 2012). This advantage has given the
Bangladesh government leverage in negotiations
with other GVC constituencies that Cambodia does
not have. Even in the aftermath of the Rana Plaza
tragedy that exposed the extent of distortions in
Bangladeshi apparel factories, only a few global
brands threatened to divest if the situation did not
improve, and none actually left (Barrett, BaumannPauly, & Gu, 2018). Bangladesh’s comparative
advantage appears to diminish interdependence
asymmetries, giving its own societal logic greater
weight in the negotiation for value distribution.
Cambodia’s relative weakness, in contrast, introduces high interdependence asymmetries, enabling
the societal logic of the high-interdependence
producing entities to prevail and dictate outcomes.
The example of Cambodia demonstrates how the
empowerment of labor via unions, supported by
both local government policy and US policy,
operated to bring about social change. Absent these
forces, as the example of Bangladesh shows, lead
firms were unable to instill change (Bair et al.,
2020). This conclusion is consistent with studies
that point to the complementarity between
transnational forces and local institutions as key
for social change (Bartley, 2011; Coslovsky &
Locke, 2013; Locke, 2013).
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Cell 3: Distributional Outcomes Negotiated
Between Conflicting Interdependence Logics
of Consuming and Producing Entities
Cell-3 GVCs represent a collision of conflicting
societal logics that blend low-interdependence
consuming countries with those of high-interdependence producers. These GVCs are the outcome
of growing demand in low-interdependence countries, typically developing and emerging countries,
for products produced in the West (Deloitte, 2018;
McKinsey, 2017). Brands’ country of origin represents the sense of exclusivity and prestige that
increasingly wealthy consumers in these countries
seek to express via their consumption behavior
(Han, Nunes, & Dreze, 2010; Hennings et al., 2012;
Pino et al., 2019). These turn the location of the
production in high-interdependence countries into
a competitive imperative (Takatli, 2012). In contrast to cell-2 GVCs whereby the power of interdependence manifests via production relationships,
in cell-3 GVCs it takes place via brands and
products, at time even without any physical presence (Batrtley, Soener, & Gershenson, 2019; Bhattacharya & Sen, 2003; Bhattacharya et al., 2011).
Alas, attempts by high-interdependence producers to reflect on values and norms via branding and
positioning in low-interdependence as a means for
social change have often backfired and caused dire
consequences (Achabou & Dekhili, 2013; Torelli,
Monga, & Kaikati, 2012). An early example of such
outcomes is the Italian fashion company Benetton,
at the time Europe’s largest clothing group and one
of the world’s largest. Perhaps more than any other
fashion company, Benetton transformed its brands
and products into vehicles for the expression of
social values and norms and employed them to
address social causes such as race, inequality, and
justice. Not only did these attempts fail to bring
about desired social change in low-interdependence countries, they raised suspicion regarding
their actual motivations, and caused significant
damage to Benetton’s business. South Africa’s boycott of Benetton and its campaigns, notably those
that advocated racial equality, is a case in point
(Gee, Pinson, & Tibrewala, 1996). South Africa has
the world’s highest Gini coefficient, a measure of
inequality, double that of Italy and other European
countries.
More typically, fashion firms have relinquished
their power to bring about social change and have
opted for congruity with local value systems in lowinterdependence countries. The endorsement of
women’s traditional status in low-interdependence
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societies via fashion branding, in conflict to gender
equality views typical of high-interdependence
countries, illustrates this approach (Heinberg
et al., 2020; Hung, Li, & Belk, 2007). Benetton
itself has abandoned the social contents of its
branding in favor of conciliatory positioning as its
commitment to social causes came to be seen as a
major reason for its decline (Wells & Danskin,
2014). The high dependency of apparel companies
on low-interdependence countries as the sources of
increasingly larger shares of their business and
anticipated future growth (Deloitte, 2018; McKinsey, 2017) has given consuming countries power to
resist change. The desire of low-interdependence
consumers to associate themselves with Western
brands has not extended to social values, in contrast to consumers in high-interdependence countries (Sharma, 2011).
Cell-3 GVCs demonstrate the manifestation of the
interdependence logic in the relationships between
firms and their consumers. They suggest limits to
the ability to convey social messages and settle
conflicting societal logics via branding, and offer
indications regarding the boundaries of interdependence relationships as a force for change. Research
in this area demonstrated the limits of transnational
efforts to bring about social change in the absence of
supportive government authorities, in agreement
with cell-1 GVCs (Amanguel & Chirto, 2016; Bartley,
2018; Locke, 2013). Cell-3 GVCs illustrate similar
dynamics in relation to consumers and show the
limits of transnational solutions in the absence of
consumers’ empowerment.
Cell-2 and -3 GVCs demonstrate two types of
conflicts between the constituencies involved, as
they manifest in production (cell-2) and consumption (cell-3). In both cases, transnational forces
originating in high-interdependence countries are
confronted by resistance from local constituencies
in low-interdependence settings. In both cases, the
outcomes are determined by interdependence
asymmetries between the parties in which the logic
of the less-dependent actor prevails and dictates the
terms of the relationships (Ashraf et al., 2017;
Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005).

Cell 4: Balanced Value Distribution (Driven
by Interdependence Relationships)
Cell 4 describes GVCs whereby both the production
and the consumption take place in high-interdependence countries. The participating countries
share similar views regarding social equality and
endorse the employment of interdependence
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power to amend distributional distortions. Evidence of distorted distribution also abounds in
these societies (Piketty, 2014), but consistencies
between consuming and producing countries
enable the interdependence power to manifest
itself and amend these distortions to a large extent.
In the apparel industry, cell-4 GVCs are typically
those constructed by global fashion luxury brands.3
The imperatives of the ‘Made In’ effect and quality
control have favored the concentration of the
production in high-interdependence countries (albeit with some outsourcing to lower-cost countries), and low-price elasticity liberated these
companies from the cost pressure that has pushed
other apparel firms to move the production to lowcost countries (Tokatli, 2012). High-interdependence countries are also major markets for luxury
fashion, and the center of fashion trends and
innovation (Godart, 2012).
With a few exceptions, luxury fashion brands
were not traditionally associated with concerns
about social causes such as human rights and
wellness, even while those trends have been sweeping through elsewhere. The association of luxury
fashion with glamour, exclusivity, and celebrity
was perceived as incompatible with social justice,
and engagements with such causes even posed a
threat to brand image and reputation (Achabou &
Dekhili, 2013; Joy et al., 2012). Indeed, evidence of
distorted practices throughout the entire supply
chain abounds, from the production through the
runaway to the high-end stores (Feng & Negai,
2020).
This, however, has changed considerably in
recent years, driven by consumers’ pressure. Luxury
fashion major consumers – celebrity and other
high-value consumers – became vocal advocates of
societal causes, and demanded the introduction of
sustainability agenda in fashion as well. These
pressures have been backed by the investment
community as it started to incorporate sustainability performance in financial evaluation (Winston,
2016), and created strong incentives for the pursuit
of social causes and changing the trade-off between
social activity and economic gains that had prevailed in earlier decades.
Commitment to social causes has thus become a
competitive imperative for luxury fashion brands,
and came to be seen as a major source of differentiation and a fundamental part of the overall
brands’ image (Battachatarya & Sen, 2003; Battachatrya et al., 2011; Torelli et al., 2012). ‘Shop For
A Cause’ and charity-based campaigns by luxury
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fashion brands have proliferated, as these firms
sought to embrace societal causes in their own
supply chains as well as ‘beyond the runaway’
(Karaosman et al., 2020). The US-based Ninety
Percent fashion company has regarded its social
mission so central to its image that it adopted it as
its name. The company donates 90% of its profits to
charities of its customers’ choosing (Lewittes,
2018).
The
LVMH
Group
and
Kering’s
WeCareForModels.com project, which offers expert
advice for fashion models from nutritionists and
coaches, encapsulates the dedication of these companies to promoting the working conditions and
well-being of their models. Wages of sale associates
of high-end luxury brands, traditionally low-paid
jobs, were also under scrutiny and higher wages
became part of the social agenda, according to
Fahionista reports. Employment statistics of the US
Bureau of Labor show compensation levels of these
apparel workers on par with the median wage in
the US.
Cell-4 GVCs show the power of consumers, and
more broadly society in large, as a force for social
change. Social justice and belief in human rights
and equality are deeply embedded in the societal
fabrics of the countries involved in cell-4 GVCs,
predominantly Western European and North American countries that are the home of the world’s
largest luxury fashion brands and the largest markets for their output (Godart, 2012). Distributional
policies via taxation, minimum wage legislation,
etc., are among the world’s most egalitarian,
speaking for societal belief in social justice. Freedom of speech and plurality of views are also
fundamental principles in these societies (Barry,
2001). Increasing concerns about social justice in
recent decades, combined with digital technology
and social media that democratized freedom of
expression to an extent never seen before brought
these forces to the fore (Bachattarya et al., 2011;
Winston, 2016).4 The contrast with cell-3 GVC
vividly illustrates the varying impact of consumers’
power in different societal contexts. Interdependence asymmetries tilt the trade-off between social
behavior and economic gains into different directions, leading to the dominance of different societal logics in these respective GVCs.
Taken together, the discussion above illustrates
the variety of ways by which the interdependence
logic manifest as a force for social change in GVCs
of different types, and shows how these variations
lead to different distributional outcomes. Where
the societal characteristics that unleash the
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interdependence power are absent, e.g., in cell-1
and cell-3 GVCs, value distortion prevails, whereas
where it is unleashed by societal conditions that
endorse its power, the interdependence logic is a
powerful force for change, as cell-4 and to some
cell-2 GVCs show. These varying outcomes enable
to draw the boundaries of the interdependence
logic, and show its limits as a mechanism for social
change.
The discussion above also enables one to identify
the constituencies concerned in activating or
arresting the interdependence logic and the type
of relationships that matters for the distributional
outcomes in different GVCs, whether among producing entities as in cell-1 and cell-2 GVCs (Bartley,
2018), or else between consumers and producers
(cell-3 and cell-4 GVCs), via brands and products, at
time even without direct engagement (Bachattarya
et al., 2011, Bartley et al., 2019). Variations in
interdependence asymmetries among these constituencies shape different tradeoffs between social
behavior and economic gains and result in the
dominance of one societal logic over the other
under varying circumstances, explaining the varying distributional outcomes across different GVCs
(Ashraf et al., 2017; Greenwood et al., 2011). In the
following section, I discuss the ways by which
governments influence these dynamics.

GOVERNMENT POLICY AND THE POWER OF
INTERDEPENDENCE RELATIONSHIPS AS
A FORCE FOR VALUE DISTRIBUTION IN GVCS
Passive Government Policy
By design or default, governments may relinquish
their power to advance social welfare in GVCs and
delegate authority for distributional issues to private
entities (Bartley, 2018; Mayer & Phillips, 2017). Such
passive governments are common in cell-4 GVCs,
typically reflecting neoliberal ideas about ‘the power
of the market to fix the market’ (Budish, Lee, &
Shim, 2019), and solve social problems without
government intervention. As I have shown above, in
such circumstances, the power of interdependence
relationships becomes the force for change, and
evokes a variety of non-regulatory mechanisms that
create a market for social justice, modifying behavior
in directions that correct for distributional distortions by dynamics that are internal to the supply
chain (Strang & Braithwaite, 2001).
The discussion above has also shown that while
this approach has often been effective in improving
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distributional outcomes in cell-4 GVCs that operate
in various high-interdependence countries, its success in low-interdependence countries has been
mixed at best. Absent societal pressure to channel
the power of interdependencies towards advancing
social justice, passive governments enable private
actors to utilize their power to appropriate disproportional shares of values themselves, as the example of Bangladesh factory owners demonstrates.
Lead firms may put price pressure on manufacturers, which is often passed on to workers in the form
of low wages and poor working conditions (Human
Rights Watch, 2019; Locke, 2013; Locke & Samel,
2018). They were also found to award work to
factories run in full compliance with their codes of
conducts, whereas those that violated these codes
continue to receive work (Bartley, 2011). In a study
of the garment industry in Indonesia, Amengual
and Chirot (2016) show that efforts by the ILO
Better Work Program to improve distributional
outcomes are also conditioned upon the presence
of active governments that empower global constituencies to enforce compliance. Amengual et al.
(2020) show that rigid contracting relationships
prevented the buyer from using order allocation to
reward improvement and inflexible commercial
relationships constrain buyers’ ability to provide
incentives to promote labor compliance. Nor is the
effectiveness of civil society as a force for social
change always self-evident in the absence of government. As increasing shares of GVC value are
generated by lead firms originating in low interdependence countries and sold in such countries
(cell-3 GVCs), civil society may not be a force for
just value distribution and social welfare
(Coslovsky, 2014).

Facilitative Government Policy
Governments of both producing and consuming
countries may play a facilitative role by steering the
direction of actions by GVC constituencies towards
socially desired outcomes. In this capacity, governments create the conditions that enable GVC
constituencies to unleash the interdependence
power towards balanced value distribution (Bartley,
2011; Distelhorst et al., 2015). For instance, governments may introduce policies that reinforce
actions by private actors towards improvement of
labor standards. Studies suggest that in many cases,
such facilitating actions by governments might be
the key predictor of lead firms’ ability to impose
codes of conduct and ensure manufacturers’ compliance (Amengual, 2010; Coslovskey, 2014;
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Coslovsky & Locke, 2013; Locke, 2013; Locke,
Rissing, & Pal, 2013; Zeitlin, 2011).
Another venue via which producing government
policies can facilitate the power of interdependence
relationships is by reducing interdependence asymmetries in GVCs relationships, for instance, by supporting labor unions. Such endorsements facilitate
the emergence of labor unions and enable labor to
exercise collective agency and bargain for enhanced
pay and working conditions, as the example of
Cambodia suggests as well as studies elsewhere
(Hastings, 2019; Stringer et al., 2014). Yet another
facilitative role by governments is by supporting the
development of local capabilities. As manufacturers
move up the value chain, their differentiation
options increase, strengthening their negotiating
power and enabling them to appropriate greater
value via GVC participation (Görg & Seric, 2013).
Consuming countries’ policies have also played a
facilitating role, both unilaterally and in collaboration with others, by activating the power of interdependence to bring about change. The US has
frequently evoked its power by using preferential
access clauses to demand change and force producing countries’ governments to introduce favorable
social policies. The suspension of Bangladesh’s
preferential tariffs following the Rana Plaza tragedy
until workers’ rights improve suggests an example.
This action led to a raise of the minimum wage
ahead of the requirement of Bangladesh’s labor law
(Greenhouse, 2013). The US exercised such pressure
in the Caribbean Basin as well, to analogous effects
(Schrank, 2009). Similar attempts have also been
made at the regional level, championed by the EU,
in the form of labor provisions in regional trade
agreements (Coslovsky, 2014; O’Brien et al., 2000;
Polaski, 2004). The success of the ILO Better Work
Programme in mobilizing national and global
constituencies to improve labor conditions demonstrates the facilitative power of IGOs.

Active Government Policy
Governments may assume an active role in distributing GVC value. Rather than creating the
conditions for actions by other constituencies,
which governments do as facilitators, active governments embrace themselves actions designed to
distribute value in socially desired manner. In this
capacity, governments employ legislative, monetary, and distributive power to activate interdependence dynamics (Davis, et al., 2018). In their
legislative capacity, governments can set legally
mandatory terms to dictate the conditions under
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which GVCs operate. They may also offer monetary
rewards in return to improvement of working
conditions, and employ minimum wage legislation
and taxation to distribute value (Mayer & Phillips,
2017). The so-called ‘Nordic Model’ of social
responsibility (GjØlberg, 2010) illustrates how the
interdependence logic has been institutionalized by
active governments that have been actively imposing it via their policies. The introduction of legally
binding clauses for social standards in trade agreements with strict enforcement provisions whereby
violations entail economic sanction or withdrawal
altogether, represents attempts by consuming
countries to evoke the independence logic by their
own actions (Campling et al., 2016; Haworth,
Hughes & Wilkinson, 2005).
A noteworthy difference between governments
in facilitative or active capacities relate to the tools
via which their power manifest. As facilitators,
governments may impose soft power to bring about
change whereas in their active capacity governments often employ legislative power to introduce
policies that would lead to desired outcomes. These
differences entail that active government policy is
exercised predominantly at the national level, as
regional associations and IGOs lack the enforcement power needed for such policies.
As supply chains became global in their entire
value-creating activities, however, the ability of
both national and regional governments to effectively regulate social conduct, even those domiciled
within their jurisdictions, has diminished and at
time dissipated entirely (World Bank, 2020). Increasingly fragmented and footloose GVCs have exposed
the limits of national and regional regulatory stance
to amend their conduct and revealed their legitimacy deficits as they aspire to regulate global affairs
(Mayer & Gereffi, 2010; Zhou & Cuyvers, 2011).
Studies demonstrate the failure of the EU to regulate
labor standards in apparel factories in Moldova
(Smith et al., 2018) and Morocco (Barrientos, Gereffi, & Rossi, 2011), pointing at the mismatch
between the EU goals and the global structure of
GVCs. The failure of continuous attempts to regulate social standards in GVCs on a multilateral level
via the WTO (Campling et al., 2016) have further
undermined the effectiveness of active government
policy.

Inhibitive Government Policy
Governments have the ability to do away with the
power of the interdependence logic altogether and
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undermine its effectiveness as a mechanism for
administering value distribution. They employ this
power when amendments of distributional distortions are inconsistent with their political and/or
economic goals, as the example of Ethiopia suggests. Through formal policy constraints and sanctions, governments define the scope of actions that
receive political accreditation, and approve the
private constituencies that can embrace them. They
also have the power to draw the boundaries of the
desired societal outcomes.
Governments can inhibit labor association, weakening labor’s ability to strengthen their power vis-àvis their employers, and arrest efforts by lead firms
to improve governance practices in their supply
chains. Bartley’s (2018) study of labor practices in
Indonesia and China shows that local repression
limits what global standards could accomplish.
Governments that shy away from collaborative
relationships via international institutions and
challenge their efforts to change domestic regulatory stance undermine yet another venue via which
the power of interdependence relationships can
bring about social change. Government policies
may also arrest efforts by civil society to activate the
interdependence logic as a mechanism for change.
Table 2 presents a summary of the varying roles
that governments assume in determining the effectiveness of interdependence relationships in GVCs.
It suggests that, at least in the apparel industry that
was my focus here (see more on this below),
governments’ facilitative role leads to the most
desired distributional outcomes. In this role,
whereby active governments assume the distributive capacity themselves or else undermine the
social conditions that enable it, governments create
the conditions that enable GVC constituencies to
unleash the power of interdependencies towards
just value distribution. The effectiveness of this
policy across GVC types further accentuates its
appeal. Passive policy stance, in which governments relinquish social welfare to private participants, is also effective in amending distributional
distortions, but its limited scope to high-interdependence settings undermines its power in contexts in highest need of amendments. As the
discussion above also suggests, other policy roles
arrest the interdependence logic or else undermine
its effectiveness, to the detrimental of distribution
justice. Attention thus shifts to the policy actions
that would unleash the power of interdependencies
to amend distributional distortions rather than to
tackling the task itself. This discussion suggests that
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Table 2 Government policy and the effectiveness of the interdependence logic as a mechanism for value distribution (in italics –
policies likely to lead to improved distributional outcomes)

Policy
role:

Unilaterally:
Producing countries

Consuming
countries

Multilaterally: Trade
agreements, IGOs

Passive

Responsibility for value distribution outsourced to private GVC constituencies

Facilitative

Enable activation
interdependence power by
other participants:
1. Supportive legislation to lead
firms’ initiatives;
2. Reduce interdependence
asymmetries: Capability
development of local
manufacturers;
3. Reduce interdependence
asymmetries: Unionization and
labor burgeoning power
Replaces interdependence logic
in administering value
distribution:
1. Legislative role (minimum
wage);
2. Distributive role (taxes);
3. Monetary role (tax benefits)
Prevents exploitation of
interdependence power by
private GVC constituencies:
Prohibiting restrictions on lead
firms’ initiatives, labor unions,
civil society freedom of speech

Active

Inhibitive

Market access
conditional upon
improvement of
distributional
outcome: Bilaterally

Market access conditional
upon improvement of
distributional outcome:
Multilaterally; Activating
members’ actions

Legally binding
social standards
included in national
trade policy

The absence of enforcement
power undermines active
policy role

Unable/not
interested in
activating the
interdependence
logic

Prohibited by producing
country governments from
exercising their power to
activate the
interdependence logic

the interdependence logic does not replace governments. Rather, its effectiveness appears to depend
on government policies and might be undermined
without them.

DISCUSSION AND POSSIBLE EXTENSIONS
In this paper, I proposed a new mechanism for
addressing the lingering challenge of value distribution in GVCs based on the power of interdependence relationships to reward socially desired
behavior and create costs for non-compliance. By
creating markets for social justice that derive their
transformative power from within, the interdependence logic turns GVCs into their own de facto
‘regulators’ with the power to self-correct for

Implications for value
distribution

High-interdependence countries:
Value distribution administered
via interdependence
relationships;
Low-interdependence
countries: Distorted value
distribution
Value distribution administered
via interdependence relationships

Effectiveness of
interdependence logic
undermined by limitations of
national and regional policy to
administer globally scattered
GVCs; Distorted value
distribution
Interdependence logic
ineffective; Distorted value
distribution

distributional distortions (Budish et al., 2019). This
logic is particularly appropriate for a production
system in which multiple constituencies scattered
around the world operate in tandem without a
hegemon with the power to set up global rules
(Schrank & Whitford, 2011; Zeitlin, 2011). I have
demonstrated multiple paths for bringing about
social change, by incorporating social values into
branding or else via mobilization of key stakeholder
groups, including governmental and non-governmental ones. I have also shown that notwithstanding its appeal, the transformative power of the
interdependence logic depends on the presence of
societal conditions that legitimate its use and
channel it towards the improvement of social
welfare. Societal context determines the extent to
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which interdependence relationships can amend
social distortions. This contextual variation is associated with diverse role of government policy, as it
determines the effectiveness of the interdependence logic as a force for change. These conclusions
are consistent with studies that have demonstrated
the critical role of domestic empowerment in the
success of transnational solutions to improve value
distribution in GVCs (Bartley, 2011; Brutlz &
McDermott, 2014; Coslovsky & Locke, 2013; Distelhorst et al., 2015; Locke, 2013). The employment
of the interdependence logic enables me to offer a
novel perspective to the mechanisms through
which the complementarity between transnational
solutions and local institutions emerge.
Moreover, I extended the scope of discussions of
value distribution to GVCs that have received
limited attention by research thus far. Echoing
the predominant nature of GVCs during the last
decades (Milberg & Winkler, 2013; Powell, 2014),
extant research has focused almost entirely on
North–South GVCs (cell-2, Fig. 2). Recent developments, including growing South–South production
relationships (cell-1 GVCs), changing balance
between consuming and producing countries
(cell-3 GVCs) and between labor and capital (cell4 GVCs) have given rise to GVCs of different types.
Anti-globalization sentiments, automation and
robotics, and most recently the global COVID-19
pandemic, have caused lead firms to shift production to their home countries in the developed
world, transforming cell-2 GVCs into cell 4. As I
have shown in this article, these GVCs raise different challenges for value distribution and embody
varying means for the employment of the interdependence logic as a force for change. Their incorporation in the theoretical framework I developed
enabled me to extend theory and policy discussions
in important ways and draw attention to relationships that have gone unnoticed by extant research.
The paper opens up a large area for future research
to further articulate the dynamics of the interdependence logic and draw its boundaries as a force for
change. GVCs vary considerably in their structure,
the nature of the transactions, and participants’ skill
levels (Gereffi et al., 2005; Mahutga, 2014), and these
differences affect interdependence asymmetries and
the transformative power of interdependence relationships. For instance, while in the apparel industry
there are considerable power asymmetries between
manufacturers and lead firms, these are much smaller
in the electronic industry (Locke & Samel, 2018).
Under such circumstances, lead firms have little, if
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any, leverage over manufacturers, questioning their
effectiveness as agents of change (Locke et al., 2013).
Pressure by civil society activists to amend distributional distortions likewise varies considerably across
GVCs. Anti-sweetshop campaigns have been a major
force for change in the apparel industry (Distelhorst
& Locke, 2018) but have seldom been activated in the
mobile technology industry, in spite of considerable
distributional distortions (Kraemer et al., 2011). The
framework I developed here appears to be most
effective in amending distributional distortions in
certain types of GVCs, notably buyer-dominated
GVCs (Gereffi et al., 2005; Mahutga, 2014). Its
broader validity beyond these GVCs requires further
scrutiny by future research.
Future research may also develop the understanding of the societal characteristics that affect
the interdependence logic and its transformative
power. Developing measures of this construct that
would enable validate the framework I developed
based on large-scale data would support this
endeavor. There are no rigorous ways to measure
the prevalence of the interdependence logic in a
society, but some measures could offer indicative
evidence. For instance, egalitarian view and the
likelihood of societal pressure towards just social
distribution are likely to be reflected in measures
such as taxation policy, minimum wage legislation,
and Gini coefficients. Similarly, freedom of expression can be proxy by measures of global freedom
and Internet freedom. The number of NGOs in a
country and the number of IGOs to which a
country is a signatory are indicative of the power
of these constituencies to instill change.
The study of GVCs situated in settings that do
not support the interdependence logic as a force for
change (cell 1 in Fig. 2) is also warranted in order to
offer insights into possible solutions for distributional distortions under such circumstances. Future
research may inquire broadly about alternative
solutions in the absence of local inclination to
enable the interdependence logic.
Another important task for future research is the
study of new types of GVC participants, as they
affect the dynamics of interdependence relationships and distributional outcomes. One such noteworthy participant is lead firms from lowinterdependence countries, often former contract
manufacturers to global brands that upgraded
along the value chain and started to sell their
products under their own brand names around the
world (Dindial et al., 2020; Tokatli, 2007).
Although originating in low-interdependence
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countries, these firms often adopt most advanced
governance practices in their GVCs, treating them
as central to their efforts to establish themselves as
credible and legitimate global brands and an
imperative for their global aspiration. Turkey’s
Mavi jeans is a case in point. The company aims
at much higher corporate responsibility and occupational practices than those required by Turkey’s
stock exchange where the firm is listed. Mavi had
introduced voluntarily governance practices based
on standards of high-interdependent countries,
although more than 80% of its suppliers and nearly
90% of its labor force are based in Turkey (Avery &
Yucaoglu, 2019). This example shows that consuming-country standards can shape social practices in
GVCs from far away also for less embedded entities
(Bartley et al., 2019), and they are more influential
than that of home countries.
Another change in GVC dynamics that warrants
additional research attention is the rise of a new
type of small fashion company that enters the
market in large numbers in recent years, and is
changing market dynamics and power relationships (McKinsey, 2020). The small scale of these
firms is transforming a traditionally concentrated
oligopolistic market of large global firms outsourcing from highly fragmented manufacturing
industries into more equal balance of power
between lead firms and their suppliers. It undermines lead firms’ power to impose their governance
practices on their suppliers, challenging a major
venue for correction of distribution distortions
(Locke, 2013). Civil society is also less attentive to
the activities of such small firms and seldom targets
their social standards (Geferri & Mayer, 2010),
further weakening the power of interdependence
relationships as a mechanism for change.
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NOTES
1

Different terms have been employed in research
in this area to describe the processes by which raw
material, intermediaries, and semi-finished goods
circulate among multiple participants scattered
around the world and brought to market (see Kano,
Tsang, & Yeung, 2020 for review). A few predominant terms have emerged. These are global commodity chains (GCC) and its more recent evolution
into the so-called global value chains (GVC) (Gereffi, 2018), often referred to as GCC/GVC. Another
common term is global production networks (GPN)
(Coe & Yeung, 2015). These terms are underpinned
by different theories and varying conceptualizations of the production systems. Although I blend
elements of both approaches, I employ the term
GVC because it is the more commonly employed in
the literature.
2
Implicit here is the assumption that the production and consumption are separated and take place
in different countries, which is the typical case of
GVCs. Value chains that do not correspond to this
condition, commonly referred to as horizontal
investment, are outside the scope of this paper.
3
The introduction of robotics to apparel production has increased the prevalence of such GVCs
beyond luxury fashion, but so far has been small in
scale.
4
Legislation by national and regional authorities,
notably the EU, might have also played a role in
legitimizing these societal concerns and supporting
the conditions that enable their expression (Bartley, 2011; Campling et al., 20116). I will address
this role in greater detail in the next section.
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Antràs, P. 2020. Conceptual aspects of global value chains.
World Bank Economic Review
Ashraf, N., Ahmadsimab, A. & Pinkse, J. 2017. From animosity to
affinity: The interplay of competing logics and interdependence in cross-sector partnerships. Journal of Management
Studies, 54: 793–822
Avery, J., & Yucaoglu, G. 2019. Mavi: Fashioning a path to
brand growth. Harvard Business School Case #9-517-075
Bair, J. & Werner M. 2011. Commodity chains and the uneven
geographies of global capitalism: A disarticulations perspective. Environment and Planning A, 43: 988–997
Bair, J., Anner, M., & Blasi, J. 2020. The political economy of
private and public regulation in Post-Rana Plaza Bangladesh. ILR Review, 73(4): 969–994
Baldwin, R. E. 2012. Global supply chains: Why they emerged,
why they matter, and where they are going. Centre for
Economic Policy Research (CEPR), Discussion Paper No.
DP9103
Baldwin, R. E. 2016. The great convergence: Information technology and the new globalization. Cambridge: Harvard University
Press.
Bapuji, H., Ertug, G., & Shaw, J.D. 2020. Organizations and
societal economic inequality: A review and way forward.
Academy of Management Annals, 14: 60–91
Barnett, M. & Duvall, R. 2005. Power in international politics.
International Organization, 59: 39–75.
Barnett, M., & Finnemore, M. 2004. Rules for the world:
International organizations in global politics. Cornell University
Press, Ithaca
Barrett, P.M. & Baumann-Pauly, D. 2019. Made in Ethiopia:
Challenges in the Garment Industry’s New Frontier. NYU Stern,
Center for Business and Human Rights
Barrett P., Baumann-Pauly D. and Gu A. 2018. Five years after
rana plaza: The way forward. NYU Stern Center for Business
and Human Rights
Barrientos, S., Gereffi, G., & Rossi, A. 2011. Economic and social
upgrading in global production networks: A new paradigm for
a changing world. International Labor Review, 150(3–4): 319–
340
Barry, B. 2001. Culture and Equality: An Egalitarian Critique of
Multiculturalism. Harvard University Press, Mass. Boston
Bartley, T. 2011. Transnational governance as the layering of
rules: Intersections of public and private standards. Theoretical
Inquiries in Law, 12: 517–542
Bartley, T., 2018. Rules without rights: Land, labor, and private
authority in the global economy. Oxford: Oxford University
Press
Bartley, T., Soener, M., & Gershenson, C. 2019. Power at a
distance: Organizational power across boundaries. Sociology
Compass, 13(10): 1–14
Berik G. & Rodgers YVMD. 2010. Options for enforcing labour
standards: Lessons from Bangladesh and Cambodia. Journal of
International Development, 22: 56–67
Bhattacharya, C.B., & Sen, S. 2003. Consumer–company
identification: A framework for understanding consumers’
relationships with companies. Journal of Marketing, 67(2): 76–
88.
Bhattacharya, C.B., Sen, S., & Korschun, FD. 2011. Leveraging
corporate responsibility: The stakeholder route to maximizing

Journal of International Business Policy

Lilac Nachum

business and social value. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
Brechenmacher, S. 2017. Civil Society Under Assault: Repression
and Responses in Russia, Egypt, and Ethiopia. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Bruszt, L. & McDermott G.A. (eds.) 2014. Levelling the playing
field: Transnational regulatory integration and development.
Oxford University Press: Oxford and New York.
Budish, E., Lee, R. S., & Shim, J. J. 2019. Will the market fix the
market? A theory of stock exchange competition and innovation. NBER w25855.
Cabral, S., Mahoney, J., McGahan, A. & Potoski, M. (eds.) 2019.
Value creation and value appropriation in the context of public
and non-profit organizations. Strategic Management Journal,
40(4): Special Issue
Campling, L., Harrison, J., Richardson, B., & Smith, A. 2016. Can
labour provisions work beyond the border? Evaluating the
effects of EU free trade agreements. International Labour
Review, 155(3): 357–82
Caney, S. 2005. Global interdependence and distributive justice.
Review of International Studies, 31(2): 389-399
Caschili, S., Medda, F.R. & Wilson, A. 2015. An interdependent
multi-layer model: Resilience of international networks. Networks and Spatial Economics, 15: 313–335
Casciaro, T., & Piskorski, M. J. 2005. Power imbalance, mutual
dependence, and constraint absorption: A closer look at
resource dependence theory. Administrative Science Quarterly, 50(2): 167–199.
Chalmers J. 2013. Special Report: How textile kings weave a
hold on Bangladesh. Reuters, May 2nd.
Chambers S., & Kopstein J. 2006. Civil society and the state. In
J.S. Dryzek et al. (eds.), The Oxford handbook of political theory.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 363–381
Chan, J., Pun, N., & Selden, M. 2013. The politics of global
production: Apple, Foxconn and China’s new working class.
New Technology, Work and Employment, 28(2): 100–115.
Chatain, O. & Zemsky, P. 2011. Value creation and value
capture with frictions. Strategic Management Journal, 32(11):
1206–1231.
Coe, N.M., & Yeung, H.W.C. 2015. Global production networks:
Theorizing economic development in an interconnected world.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Coe, N.M., & Yeung, H.W.C. 2019. Global production networks: Mapping recent conceptual developments. Journal of
Economic Geography, 19(4): 775–801
Coe, N.M., Dicken, P., & Hess, M. 2008. Global production
networks: Realizing the potential. Economic Geography, 8(3):
271–95.
Coleman, P.T. (ed.) 2011. Conflict, interdependence, and justice:
The intellectual legacy of Morton Deutsch. New York: Springer.
Coleman, P.T., Kugler, K., Mitchinson, A., Chung, C. &
Musallam, N. 2010. The view from above and below: The
effects of power and interdependence asymmetries on conflict
dynamics and outcomes in organizations. Negotiation and
Conflict Management Research, 3: 283–311
Coleman, P. T., Vallacher, R. R. & Nowak, A. 2011. Tackling the
great debate. In P.T. Coleman (ed.), pp, 273–289.
Coslovsky, S. 2014. Flying under the radar? The state and the
enforcement of labour laws in Brazil. Oxford Development
Studies, 42(2): 190–216
Coslovsky, S., & Locke, R. 2013. Parallel paths to enforcement:
Private compliance, public regulation, and labor standards in
the Brazilian sugar sector. Politics & Society, 41: 497–526
Dahl, R.P. 1957. The concept of power. Behavioral Science, 2:
201–218.
Dallas, M.P., 2014. Cloth without a weaver: Power, emergence
and institutions across global value chains. Economy and
Society, 43(3): 315–345.
Dallas, M.P., Ponte, S., & Sturgeon, T.J. 2019. Power in global
value chains. Review of International Political Economy, 26(4): 666–694

GVCs and markets for social justice

Davis, D., Kaplinsky, R., & Morris, M. 2018. Rents, power and
governance in global value chains. Journal of World-Systems
Research, 24(1): 43–71.
Dedrick, J., Kraemer K.L., & Linden, G. 2011. The distribution of
value in the mobile phone supply chain. Telecommunications
Policy, 35(6): 505–521
Deloitte. 2018. Global powers of luxury goods. Deloitte, Italy.
Deutsch, M. 1949. A theory of cooperation and competition.
Human Relations, 21(2): 52–91.
Deutsch, M. 1973. The resolution of conflict. Yale University Press,
New Haven: CT
Deutsch, M. 1985. Distributive justice: A social–psychological
perspective. Yale University Press, New Haven.
Dicken, P., Kelly, P. F., Olds, K., & Yeung, H. 2001. Chains and
networks, territories and scales: Toward a relational framework
for analyzing the global economy. Global Networks, 1(2):
1470–2266.
Dindial, M., Clegg, J., & Voss, H. 2020. Between a rock and a
hard place: A critique of economic upgrading in global value
chains. Global Strategy Journal, 10(3): 473– 495
Distelhorst, G., & Locke, R.M. 2018. Does compliance pay?
Firm-level trade and social institutions. American Journal of
Political Science, 62(3): 695–711
Distelhorst, G., Locke, R.M., Pal, T., & Samel H.M. 2015.
Production goes global, compliance stays local: Private regulation in the global electronics industry. Regulation & Governance, 9(3): 224–242.
Donaghey, J., & Reinecke, J. 2018. When industrial democracy
meets corporate social responsibility: A comparison of the
Bangladesh Accord and Alliance as responses to the Rana Plaza
disaster. British Journal of Industrial Relations, 56(1): 14–42.
Emerson, R. M. 1962. Power-dependence relations. American
Sociological Review, 27: 31–41.
Farrell, H., & Newman, A. 2019. Weaponized interdependence:
How global economic networks shape state coercion. International Security, 44(1): 42–79.
Feng, P., & Ngai, C.B. 2020. Doing more on the corporate
sustainability front: A longitudinal analysis of CSR reporting of
global fashion companies. Sustainability, 12: 2477
Gee, F., Pinson, C., &, Tibrewala, V. 1996. United Colors of
Benetton. INSEAD Case IN1261-PDF-ENG
Gereffi, G. 2018. Global value chains and development: Redefining
the contours of 21st century capitalism. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Gereffi, G. 2019. Global value chains and international development policy: Bringing firms, networks and policy-engaged
scholarship back in. Journal of International Business Policy, 2: 195–210
Gereffi, G., Humphrey, J., & Sturgeon, T. 2005. The governance
of global value chains. Review of International Political Economy,
12(1): 78–104
GjØlberg, M. 2009. The origin of corporate social responsibility:
Global forces or national legacies? Socio-Economic Review, 7(4):
605–637
GjØlberg, M. 2010. Varieties of corporate social responsibility
(CSR): CSR meets the ‘‘Nordic Model’’. Regulation & Governance, 4(2): 203–229
Godart, F. 2012. Unveiling Fashion: Business, Culture and Identity
in the most Glamorous Industry. Houndsmills: INSEAD Business
Press, Palgrave McMillan.
Görg, H. & Seric, A. 2013. With a little help from my friends:
Supplying to multinationals, buying from multinationals, and
domestic firm performance. UNIDO Development Policy,
Statistics and Research Brunch
Grabs, J., & Ponte S. 2019. The evolution of power in the global
coffee value chain and production network. Journal of
Economic Geography, 19: 803–828.
Greckhamer, T. 2011. Cross-cultural differences in compensation level and inequality across occupations: A set-theoretic
analysis. Organization Studies, 32(1): 85–115

Lilac Nachum

Greenhouse, S. 2013. Obama to suspend trade privileges with
Bangladesh. New York Times, June 27th.
Greenwood, R., Diaz A.M. & Li S.X. 2011. The multiplicity of
institutional logics and the heterogeneity of organizational
responses. Organization Science, 21(2): 521–539.
Hamilton, G.G., Senauer, B., & Petrovic, M. (Eds.) 2011. The
Market Makers: How Retailers are Reshaping the Global Economy. Oxford: Oxford University Press
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